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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
TRUSTS--EFFECT OF APPENDAGE OF WORD "TRUSTEE" IN
RELIEVING PARTY FROM PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.-Plaintiffs
Hatfield and Hughes, contracted to sell to defendant, Charl-
ton, "trustee" all outstanding stock in a corporation; de-
ferred payments, for which this suit was brought, to be evi-
denced by notes of the company and as these notes were
taken up, the proceeds were to be applied to those debts of
the company for which plaintiffs had "personally obligated
themselves. Note that express obligation of defendant
was not referred to. Plaintiffs sought to charge defendant
personally with these notes; while he contended that the
.Thole transaction was a plan to reorganize and re-finance
the company, and that he was acting as trustee for the
plaintiffs in executing this purpose. Held, where, in a con-
tract one of the parties thereto is described as trustee, with
duties and obligations thereby imposed of a trust nature,
the term "trustee" so employed will not be regarded simply
as descriptio personae, but as having been used advisedly,
and as creating in the trustee the trust relationship implied,
and as binding him as trustee only, and of which all per--
sons dealing with him must take notice. Hughes et al. v.
Charlton et al., 141 S. E. 1 (W. Va. 1927).
The doctrine of descriptio personae, as defined by BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, is "the use of a word or phrase merely for
the purpose of identifying or pointing out the person in-
tended, and not as an intimation that the language in con-
nection with which it occurs is to apply to him only in the
official or technical character in which it is used."
The meaning of the phrase "binds him as trustee only"
is uncertain. The general rule is that one who contracts
as trustee, without further facts, is liable personally on the
contract. This is the decision of Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S.
330: "As a trastee holds the estate, although only with the
power and for the purpose of managing it, he is personally
bound by the contracts he makes as trustee, even where
designating himself as such. The mere use of the word
trustee or any other name of office or employment will not
discharge him. If a trustee contracting for the benefit of
the estate wants to protect himself from personal liability,
he must stipulate that he is not to be personally responsible
but that the other party is to look solely to the trust estate."
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'Phis case is cited with approval and followed in American
Trust Company v. Canevin, 184 Fed. 657, 661: "One who con-
tracts, adding to his name the word trustee, will neverthe-
less be personally liable, unless the party with whom he
contracts understands that he intends to bind only the trust
estate, and not himself." The rule is stated in the dissent-
ing opinion thus: "The mere appendage 'trustee' to Charl-
ton's name is not of itself sufficient to indicate that the obli-
gation incurred was that of a third person." The West Va.
cases cited, however, are questions of the form in which
judgments should be taken against a fiduciary, and are not
directly in point. The same decision was reached in Bayh v.
Hanna, 69 Ind. App. 395, 122 N. W. 7, and in Dunlevie v.
Spanenberg, 121 N. Y. S. 299. Cases are collected in 28
HARV. L. REV. 725, and in BOGERT TRUSTS, n., p. 297, and p.
300. Other authorities upon this subject are innumerable.
The case may well be justified upon the facts of the case,
under the general rule. There was sufficient notice to the
other party, aside from the act of the defendant in signing
as trustee, by the stipulation in the contract. No mention
was made that he was to be personally liable, but, which
seems expressly to rebut such proposition, it was agreed
that the deferred payments, for which plaintiffs seek to
charge the defendant, were to be evidenced by the notes of
the company. Upon what constitutes sufficient stipulation
against liability, see Shoe & Leather National Bank v. Dix,
123 Mass. 148, where a party signed as "trustee, but not in-
dividually," and Thayer v. Wendall, 1 Gall. (Fed.) 37, where
a party signed as "trustee, but not otherwise." In both cases,
parties so signing were relieved from personal obligation.
See also 28 HARV. L. REV. 725. Thus, if the phrase "binds him
as trustee only," is construed to mean "binds him as a con-
tracting trustee is ordinarily bound," then the court has but
stated the general rule, though certainly in an ambiguous
way. But, reading this phrase with the other statement
"Use of word 'trustee' would not be regarded merely as
descriptio personae," and with certain utterances in the
opinion, the court seems to have laid down a rule much
broader than this-that one who signs as trustee, even
without disclosing upon the face of the instrument the name
of the party for whom he is acting, and without stipulating
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against express liability, is nevertheless relieved from per-
sonal liability on the contract. Therefore, the court ap-
parently has repudiated the doctrine of descriptio personae,
in favor of a rule which has seldom, if ever, been recog-
nized by the courts. No authority has been cited by the
court to sustain this proposition, and only one case has been
found which even remotely seems to support this principle.
That is the case of Printup v. Trammel, 25 Ga. 240, where a
party signed a promissory note as "Daniel Printup, trustee
for Mtrs. Abbey Farrar," in which the court held: "A. trustee
is not liable out of his own estate, on a note given by him as
'trustee' and so expressed when the consideration of the
note enured exclusively to the cestui que trust." The
Georgia court argues briefly against the personal liability of
a trustee so contracting. However, the duty is upon the
trustee to prove that the consideration inured to the bene-
fit of the trust estate, which was the difficulty of the defendant
in the principal case. The only case cited by the majority
opinion in the principal case, Taylor v. Davis, supra, is di-
rectly in support of the general rule.
What will be the effect of this decision? It is possible,
though highly improbable, that a later court may follow
this case in its apparent repudiation of the doctrine of
descriptio personae. With the increasing tendency of the
courts to give a remedy directly against the trust estate, or
rather, to extend the number of exceptions to the general
rule, will naturally come the relaxation of the rule of per-
sonal liability of trustee. See the article of Justice Brandeis
in 15 AM. L. REv. 449. But, should the same question arise
in this jurisdiction within the next few years, the probabil-
ity is that the Court will then construe the statement in the
syllabus of this case to mean that it is but a statement of
the general rule. This, the writer believes, may well be
done, as shown above. We can only wait until the Court is
given an opportunity to decide upon this question again.
-CLAIR SMITH.
FATHER'S CONSENT TO UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT OF INFANT
SON IN DANGEROUS OCCUPATION AS BAR TO RECOVERY IN Ac-
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